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intersubjectivity (and so of the people we encounter) over against the 
potentially idolatrous worship of moral abstractions. Abstractions can be-
come fierce gods, and they sometimes demand human sacrifice. In this 
and later chapters, their construals of the positions of Plato and Ockham 
are similarly subject to criticism. Still, I think we can cut Baggett and Walls 
a good deal of slack. They are not arguing against Ockham the man, but 
against a view they have identified as Ockhamism, and if they have failed 
to include in this criticism all possible versions of Ockhamism, their criti-
cisms of this version are keen and instructive. The same goes for their pre-
sentation of the Euthyphro problem. Those of us who spend our lives in 
Plato’s texts might not recognize their explanation of the problem from the 
eponymous dialogue, but we can nevertheless look at the problem they do 
address with admiration of their philosophical insight and rigor. To their 
credit, they make a small nod in the direction of Sartrean intersubjectivity 
in chapter 5 when putting (a little) distance between themselves and the 
moral arguments of William Lane Craig (100).
This book has a clear aim, and a clear trajectory, and watching Baggett 
and Walls follow that trajectory is instructive and rewarding. While I am 
not certain that they succeed in making their argument as simple or as ac-
cessible as they had hoped, the book has the great strength of giving us a 
fresh and serious look at a topic that might matter more than anything else.
The Poetics of Evil: Towards an Aesthetic Theodicy, by Philip Tallon. Oxford 
University Press, 2012. xx + 251 pages. $74.00 (hardcover).
DAVID BROWN, The Divinity School, University of St. Andrews
As the title of his book indicates, Tallon seeks to restore an aesthetic di-
mension in Christian approaches to the problem of evil. However, rather 
than placing them alongside moral considerations where the aesthetic 
inevitably comes a poor second, he suggests that it be thought more in 
terms of Eleonore Stump’s second person perspective, insights that can 
enrich the believing Christian’s understanding of the nature of the divine 
creation. To that end, Tallon’s discussion proceeds by three stages, taking 
in turn the traditional harmony argument (with good balancing evil) and 
then the issue of tragedy before turning finally to more recent discussions 
of “horrors.”
Tallon’s interest in the first issue appears to have taken its rise from dis-
satisfaction with Barth’s familiar remark that the music of Mozart enabled 
him to hear “the whole context of providence.” The balance of light and 
shade emerges, Tallon suggests, much more clearly in many another com-
poser, and indeed Irenaeus’s more dynamic, symphonic understanding is 
better than Augustine’s essentially static picture. Yet it is Augustine who 
is defended at length from a number of critiques, including the claim of 
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Madden and Hare that the perception and acceptance of such a harmonic 
balance must undermine any strong motivation to correct injustice. On 
tragedy Tallon takes issue with George Steiner’s claim that “Christianity 
is an anti-tragic vision of the world,” arguing that this is to misunder-
stand the nature of tragedy which, as Iris Murdoch rightly saw, is a mixed 
genre both in the nature of the principal character (at once innocent and 
guilty) and in the outcome (elements of the comic and of hope are never 
entirely absent). And so the solution is not, as with David Bentley Hart, 
to attack the “elitism” of the tragic vision as a morally suspect substitute 
for complete integration within the overall harmony, but rather to accept 
its full power in the particular moment, while at the same time welcom-
ing the impetus it also gives to compassion and resistance. On Murdoch’s 
account, Auschwitz could not be described as tragic because it offers no 
consolation and so her preferred description was as a “horror,” the same 
term employed by Marilyn McCord Adams to identify the class of events 
that she sees as such a strong challenge to Christian theology. Tallon ac-
cepts Adams’s basic contention that theodicy must provide a personal 
answer to each suffering individual. Although he suggests that Adams’s 
low view of humanity introduces an overall incoherence into her position 
(how is a shared moral discourse with God then possible?), he endorses 
two of its key elements that he takes to be aesthetic: first, the compen-
satory vision of the divine beauty in heaven; and, secondly, the ability 
to identify with Christ’s suffering on the cross. It is the last with which 
the book ends, leaving, as he puts it, Augustine behind in order “to find 
a bloodier but more satisfying beauty: a beauty scourged, shamed, and 
crowned with thorns.”
Such a brief outline scarcely does justice to Tallon’s rich discussion in 
which the views of numerous contemporary philosophers and theolo-
gians are considered. Indeed, at times one might have wished for more 
detailed reflection from the author himself since, inevitably, the very 
range of reference produces a more complex presentation than might 
otherwise have been the case. Here, all I can do is focus on Tallon’s three 
categories and certain tensions that result from the author’s failure to 
apply a single understanding of the beautiful or at any rate explain how 
they relate to one another. Ironically, it is in some ways the most ancient 
and the most modern that are the closest, for, despite Adams’s insistence 
on the requirement of a solution for each and every individual (with 
which no ancient writer would have agreed), her balancing of a personal 
vision of divine beauty over against past horrors merely replicates on the 
individual scale what Augustine would have applied on the corporate 
with his principle of harmony. The same, however, cannot be said for the 
tragic. The tragic acquires what beauty it may have, as Tallon admits, not 
through any ultimate resolution but in the particularity of the moment, 
in, for example, the dignity with which the hero faces his fate. In short, if 
the word beauty is to be used, it is now at quite a distance from any of the 
classical notions of proportion and balance. One could of course respond 
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that proportion remains in the lot of the individual being deserved but, 
while perhaps true in many cases, it is not this fact alone that legitimates 
the term “tragic” but rather the manner in which whatever desert is 
present is transcended. Indeed, the closer an account gets to the merely 
deserved and so to proportion, the further does it seem to stray from 
what we customarily call the tragic.
The problem then intensifies when we try to assimilate the life of Christ 
to either category. On the classical model, the features to which appeal is 
made are usually purely extrinsic, the tree of the Fall balancing the wood 
of the Cross and so on. This is not to say that such features are unimport-
ant. They add to the fittingness of things, as Anselm and many another 
would have stressed. They can even touch the very heart of what was 
occurring on the Cross, as in Paul’s “as by one man” (Rom. 6.12ff.). But 
that is not commonly how the Cross is approached today, nor how it is 
used in Fallon and Adams, where identification with those suffering is the 
all-important issue, and so the Cross is in effect made to parallel the tragic. 
While it is easy to see how someone in pain might have their troubles 
eased by reflecting on Christ’s own suffering and his presence with them 
now in their agony, it is harder to make sense of Adams’s claim that this 
could be absorbed retrospectively as sufficient compensation or explana-
tion. Although Tallon endorses Adams at this point, his concern seems less 
with the mechanism of how exactly such suffering might contribute and 
more with the legitimacy of seeing an aesthetic dimension to that contri-
bution. Yet, as the quotation above would seem to indicate, Tallon does 
not give this either the traditional classical or tragic form. Instead, the suf-
fering itself is declared beautiful.
This way of putting matters is now a common theme among contem-
porary theologians. It could of course be interpreted as shorthand for the 
nobility of life and attitude expressed through the scourging and cruci-
fixion, and then it would once more be aligned with the aesthetics of the 
tragic. But usually a somewhat different claim seems to be in play: that the 
suffering itself was made beautiful by the fact of he who bore it. In other 
words, the divinity inherent in the act as itself the source of all beauty is 
allowed to redefine what it is to be beautiful under such circumstances. 
Yet, ought not such an idea to be resisted on both linguistic and theo-
logical grounds? The linguistic objection is that it creates a usage that pre-
vents common discussion across religious boundaries. No one except a 
Christian will speak in this way. But for me the theological objection is still 
more telling. Effectively, it prevents us from describing the incarnation as 
divine engagement with what God is not: engagement not just with the 
limitations of human nature but also with the dreadful realities of evil and 
ugliness. They are redeemed not by being denied but by goodness and 
beauty being allowed to emerge through them or in their despite.
In short, while Tallon seems exactly on the right lines in insisting on the 
relevance of the aesthetic, I remain puzzled by how he might integrate such 
competing, alternative descriptions of the beautiful into a single overall 
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coherent account, surely a necessity if they are claimed to all have their 
source in God. Perhaps part of the trouble is that so little is written today 
on what it might mean to call God beautiful. Of course, if something like 
Aquinas’s three criteria for beauty were to be employed, the application to 
God makes good sense, but then the word is seldom now used in this way. 
Even cutting the Gordian knot and switching to an alternative term such as 
the aesthetically pleasing would provide only the superficial appearance of 
a solution, since, given the quite different sources of Tallon’s three catego-
ries, what significance, if any, attaches to the use of the shared term would 
still remain as mysterious as ever, and still more so how it might find its 
ultimate source in God. So one looks forward to a sequel from the author 
to this challenging and fascinating book that will carry forward discussion 
of such questions.
Theology without Metaphysics: God, Language, and the Spirit of Recognition, 
by Kevin W. Hector. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 293 
pages. $75.00 (paperback).
JEFF SNAPPER, University of Notre Dame
In Theology without Metaphysics Kevin Hector endeavors to rid theology of 
metaphysics without giving up true beliefs about God. Why should any-
one want theology to be metaphysics-free? Because of the violence thesis, 
the thesis that metaphysics (and anything that is metaphysical) does vio-
lence to objects by forcing them into categories. Given the violence thesis, 
if theology is metaphysical, it does violence to God. Hector, admirably, 
wants to do theology without doing violence to God. He endorses the 
violence thesis. He concludes (rightly, given his premises) that we should 
rid theology of metaphysics.
The worry, however, is that if we rid theology of metaphysics we are 
going to be left without any true beliefs about God. We want to believe, for 
example, that God is good. But we also want to get rid of any metaphysi-
cal overtones that belief might have. Once those overtones are eliminated, 
the belief may well come out not true. And that price—no true theologi-
cal beliefs—is too high for Hector. So, after filtering the toxic metaphysics 
out of the wholesome theology, we also need a non-toxic account of true 
theological beliefs.
Hector’s book has three main parts. Chapter 1 tries to remove the nasty 
metaphysics from the nourishing theology. Chapters 2–5 try to explain 
how theological beliefs can be true without help from metaphysics; they 
begin with concept use (chapter 2), move through meaning and reference 
(chapters 3–4), and conclude with a novel account of truth (chapter 5). 
Chapter 6 applies Hector’s original account of truth to specific beliefs. 
Here I focus on chapters 1 and 5.
